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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO REVIEW-DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO APPEAL FOLLOWING UNSUCCESSFUL APPLICATION FOR
PAROLE-The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first
degree and sentenced to the state penitentiary. After his application
for parole was denied, he filed an appeal to set aside the judgment
and conviction. With two judges dissenting," the Supreme Court of
Kansas dismissed the appeal. Following the case of State v. Mooney-
ham,2 the court found that by applying for parole the defendant
recognized the validity of the judgment and acquiesced therein, thus
prohibiting appellate review of his conviction. State v. Irish, 393
P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1964).
This case represents an extension of the principle by which a
defendant may lose his right of appeal by impliedly acquiescing
in his guilt.3 In Kansas, as in many other states, a defendant has
a statutory right to appeal from a criminal conviction.4 As a result,
appellate courts generally refrain from inferring that a defendant
has waived his right to review unless his acts and the surrounding
circumstances are clearly inconsistent with any other interpre-
tation.5
There are many situations similar to the principal case where
the actions of the defendant result in acquiescence in his guilt and
loss of his right to appeal.8 Although there is authority to the
contrary,7 the defendant waives his right to appeal by the payment
1. The dissenting judges reasoned that it was wrong as a matter of principle and
of law to say that a defendant acquiesced in the judgment and is denied the right to
appeal as a result of his application for parole. His application for clemency was only
the exercise of a statutory right of long standing. Justice Price, who dissented in the
opinion of this case, but joined in the decision of State v. Mooneyham, infra note 2,
declared that the decision had bothered him and he now is conviced that it was wrong
State v. Irish, 393 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Kan. 1964).
2. 192 Kan. 620, 390 P.2d 215 (1964). The defendant was convicted of grand
larceny. After his application for parole was denied he filed an affidavit intending to
appeal his conviction. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that by voluntarily making
application for parole he thereby waived any alleged trial errors and acquiesced in the
judgment.
3. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 345 Ill. App. 610, 104 N.E.2d 333 (1952) ; Bogue v.
State, 185 Ind. 243, 113 N.E. 753 (1916); State v. Morse, 191 Kan. 328, 380 P.2d 310
(1963) ; State v. Goddard, 69 Ore. 73, 133 Pac. 90 (1913).
4. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1701 (1949), "An appeal to the supreme court may
be taken by the defendant as a matter of right from any judgment against him; and
upon the appeal any decision of the court or intermediate order made in the progress
of the case may be reviewed." For similar statutes see, N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-03
(1960) ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 813 (1950).
5. E.g., State v. Conroy, 133 Iowa 195, 110 N.W. 437 (1907) ; State v. Harmon,
243 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1951) ; Village of Avon v. Popa, 960 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d
254 (1953).
6. See, e.g., State v. Morse, supra note 3; Thomas v. Warden of the Md. Penitentiary,
233 Md. 607, 195 A.2d 612 (1963) ; State v. Boulton, 229 Minn. 579, 40 N.W.2d 417 (1949)
State v. Barnhardt, 230 N.C. 223, 52 S.E.2d 904 (1949).
7. E.g., People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1954), "Based upon
these decisions and upon a consideration of the practical aspects of the situation, we thank
it only just and reasonable that the defendant be given an opportunity to clear his
name of the charge he has steadfastly denied and, in view of his timely appeal, will
not construe the payment of the fine as constituting a waiver of his right of review."
Similar cases supporting this position are, Jackson v. People, 376 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1962)
Village of Avon v. Popa, supra note 5.
RECENT CASES
of a fine which satisfies the judgment.8 A few courts limit the
waiving of an appeal to fines that are voluntarily paid.9  Corres-
pondingly, an appeal on the merits of the case will not be granted
from a conviction precipitated by a plea of guilty. 10 Exceptions to
this can be found where collateral questions, such as the validity
of the statute, the sufficiency of the information, or the jurisdiction
of the court are raised." By accepting the benefits of a suspended
sentence the defendant also waives his right to review because he
cannot accept the benefits of a judgment and at the same time
object to being bound by its undesirable portion. 12
Where the defendant accepts a parole pending the determination
of his appeal, he also waives the right to have his case reviewed,
because by accepting the parole the question before the appellate
court becomes moot."3 Although this is the weight of authority,
a few courts have held that even though the defendant is released
from jail he is still entitled to remove the stigma of the conviction
from his name. 14
The payment of a fine, plea of guilty and acceptance of a
suspended sentence, or parole are quite similar to the principal
case. The main contention of these courts is that the right to appeal
should not be allowed where the defendant has already received
a benefit from an alternate remedy. 5 In the principal case, however,
the defendant merely applied for a parole which was refused; thus
he received no relief. The apparent reasoning of the court is that
the mere application for a parole is inconsistent with any other
alternative, even though the defendant receives no beneift. Under
this holding an application for parole extinguishes one's right to
appellate review.
It is difficult to understand how this court can call the right
8. E.g., City of Goodland v. Bair, 166 Kan. 228, 199 P.2d 807 (1948) ; State v.
Boulton, supra note 6: Abbott v. State, 160 Neb. 275, 69 N.W.2d 878 (1955); Winkler
v. State. 252 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1962).
9. E.g., City of Denison v. McCord, 251 Iowa 1322, 105 N.W.2d 485 (1960) State
v. Boulton. suvra note 6. In State v. Osborne, 143 Me. 10, 54 A.2d 526, 527 (1947) the
Supremp. Judlcial Court adopted this la-emnge: " 'The dpcisinns ne not unifnnm a. to
the right of the accused to review a sentence or judgment Imposing a fine which has
been paid. According to the weight of authority, however, where accused in a criminal
case voluntarily pays the fine Imposed on him, he waives his right to an appeal, or to
a review by certiorari. Under this rule some authorities hold that there is no waiver
if the payment of the fine is involuntary, as where the fine is paid under protest to
prevent imprisonment under a void sentence, or where it is made under circumstances
amounting to duress, or where it is paid by another person without accused's authority;
but other authorities take the position that the payment of a fine, even under protest,
amounts to an execution of the sentence and, as nothing is left for further controversy,
accused is deorived of an appeal."
10. E..., Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959) ; Thomas v. Warden
of the Md. Penitentiary, supra note 6.
11. PEI. R. CRAM. P. 12(b) (2) (1961) ; People v. Kugelman, 188 Misc. 135, 67
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1947); State v. Rose, 42 Wash. 2d 509. 256 P.2d 493 (1953).
12. E.g., Renado v. Lummus. 205 Mass. 155, 91 N.E. 144 (1910) ; State v. Barnhardt,
supra note 6. Contra. State v. Heron, 92 Ariz. 114. 374 P.2d 871 (1962).
13. Nicholson v. State, 69 Okla. CrIm. 158. 100 P.2d 896 (1940): State v. Goddard,
supra note 3; Goss v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 659, 298 S.W. 585 (1927).
14. United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Dorsett v. State, 162 Tex.
Crim. 512, 287 S.W.2d 655 (1956).
15. See, e.g., State v. Dowd, 27 I1. App. 2d 429, 170 N.E.2d 179 (1960) ; Wilhite v.
Judy, 133 Kan. 589, 21 P.2d 317 (1933).
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to appellate review and an application for a parole inconsistent.
The former is an appeal for a review of the merits of the conviction,
the latter a simple application for the grace of the state. How can
a court of any conscience justify a refusal of the right of appeal on
the ground that defendant has already requested mercy? It is the
opinion of this writer that a court is unjustified in refusing a
defendant the right of appeal merely because he has applied for
parole.
EDWIN ODLAND
CITIZENS-EXPATRIATION'-DENATIONALIZATION OF NATURALIZED
CITIZENS FOR CONTINUOUS FOREIGN RESIDENCE-Appellant, a German
national by birth, emigrated to the United States with her
parents in 1939 and became a citizen of the United S t a t e s
derivatively through the naturalization of her mother in 1950. After
receiving a baccalaureate degree from Smith College in 1954, appel-
lant accepted a scholarship for postgraduate study in Europe.2
While in Paris, she became engaged to a German national whom she
married in 1956. Since that time, except for two brief visits to the
United States, appellant has resided in Germany.3 In 1959 the
United States Consulate in Dusseldorf refused to grant appellant an
extension of her passport, declaring that she had lost her United
States citizenship under the terms of section 352 (a) (1) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952. 4  The Board of Review on
the Loss of Nationality in the State Department affirmed the
Consulate's decision, and appellant challenged this ruling. Upon
appeal the United States Supreme Court held, that section 352 (a) (1)
1. Expatriation has been defined as the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939). Denationalization,
on the other hand, denotes involuntary forfeiture of citizenship Imposed by the sovereign.
WEis, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1956). Many courts
have used the terms interchangeably, and as a result, much confusion exists in the area.
No attempt has been made to distinguish between the two concepts in this comment. For
further discussion, see WEis, supra at 119-122.
2. Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Schneider v. Ruck, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
3. Appellant is the mother of four sons, two of whom were born prior to the com-
mencement of denationalization proceedings and are deemed native born, Immigration
and Nationality Act § 301(a) (7), (b), 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7), (b)(1958), but unless they come to the United States before attaining the age of twenty-
three and reside here continuously for five years, they will lose their citizenship. The
subsequent loss of their mother's citizenship does not affect their status provided they
take up permanent residence in the United States before Attaining th age of twenty-five.
Section 355, 66 Stat. 272 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1487 (1958). The status of the two sons
born subsequent to the commencement of these proceedings was dependent upon a favor-
able decision in this case. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 6.
4. 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1958): "(a) A person who has be-
come a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by-(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign
state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated,
except as provided in section 353 of this title .. " The exceptions comprised in section
353 relate, inter alia, to study abroad, ill health, and employment by the Government.
See also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 352(a) (2), 66 Stat. 269 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(2) (1958) which provides that a naturalized citizen may be ex-
patriated for residing in any foreign state for a period of five years. In Lapides v.
Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), § 404(c) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1170, the predecessor of § 352(a) (2), was upheld. In
view of the present decision, § 352 (a) (2) appears clearly unconstitutional.
